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OWNERSHIP AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF SMALL FIRMS 
 
Abstract 
Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) play an important role in international markets. 
This study argues that the ownership structures of SMEs influence their proclivity to take risks and 
expand the scale and scope of their internationalization efforts.  Data from 889 Swedish SMEs reveal 
that internal owners (CEOs and other senior executives) tend to be risk averse and have a lower 
proclivity to increase scale and scope of internationalization than external owners (venture capitalists 
and institutional investors). The results provide interesting insights into the behavioral change of 
executives regarding the scale and scope of internationalization in the presence of external ownership.  
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Small and medium enterprises (SMEs), independent firms with 500 or fewer employees (Lu 
& Beamish, 2001), play an important role in today’s international markets. SMEs “account for 
between a quarter and two-fifths of worldwide manufactured exports” (OECD, 2002:13).  In 1999, 
about 20 percent of European SMEs drew 24 to 32 percent of their sales from foreign markets. In 
the same year, 97 percent of exporting firms in the United States were SMEs.  SMEs play an equally 
important role in other parts of the world. For example, Korean SMEs accounted for roughly 40 
percent of manufacturing exports in 1999 (OECD, 2002).  
SMEs are usually limited in their resources and international experience. Therefore, they 
have to make important decisions about the scale and scope of their foreign operations. Scale refers 
to the extent to which an SME relies on foreign markets in its operations such as marketing, 
manufacturing, and R&D. Scope denotes the international geographic reach or the number of 
countries in which an SME conducts its business.  While researchers have examined the factors 
influencing the internationalization efforts of large firms (Hitt, Hoskisson & Kim, 1997; Tihanyi, 
Johnson, Hoskisson & Hitt, 2003), explanations for the variability in SMEs’ internationalization are 
limited (Westhead, Wright & Ucbasaran, 2001). 
Differences in the scale and scope of SMEs’ international operations are often attributed to 
their home market and industry conditions or the attractiveness of foreign markets (Dunning, 1988). 
Yet, SMEs in the same market or industry adopt specialized internationalization strategies, probably 
because of heterogeneity in their resource endowments and divergent managerial perceptions of the 
opportunities and threats associated with international expansion. These perceptions reflect senior 
managers’ risk preferences that, in turn, are shaped by their ownership stake. SMEs’ success or 
failure in foreign markets can undermine these owner-managers’ wealth, careers, and professional 
reputations.  
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Research suggests that equity ownership influences managers’ risk-taking propensity 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Zajac & Westphal, 1994) and the resultant willingness to assume the risks associated 
with internationalization. The success of SMEs’ internationalization can enrich managers by generating 
new growth opportunities. Yet, past research from larger firms has yielded conflicting findings on this 
issue. Though some research shows that managers become risk averse as their ownership in the firm 
increases (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Denis, Denis & Sarin, 1999), other studies reveal a positive association 
between equity incentives and managerial risk taking (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998).  These conflicting 
findings make it difficult to gauge the relationship between ownership and the scale and scope of 
SMEs’ internationalization. Researchers have also overlooked other influential external owners such as 
venture capitalists (VCs) and institutional owners, whose goals and priorities might conflict with those 
of the SMEs’ internal owners. External owners such as VCs and institutional investors (banks, 
investment firms, and other institutions such as pension funds) play a key role in the life of SMEs by 
monitoring managers and recommending strategic actions. Consequently, decisions regarding the scale 
and scope of SMEs’ internationalization are likely to reflect the preferences of the internal and external 
owners, a proposition that we examine in this paper. 
This study investigates the effect of internal and external ownership on the scale and scope of 
SMEs’ internationalization using a large sample of Swedish SMEs. Internal ownership refers to 
shareholding by the firm’s CEO and the top management team (TMT), defined as a firm’s senior 
executives who hold the position of vice president or higher.  We follow Carpenter and Sanders 
(2002), who proposed that it is important to study the incentives for the entire TMT, not only the 
CEO, to understand how internal ownership influences strategic choices. Internationalization is a 
complex and costly process that requires a thorough investigation of opportunities, building the 
infrastructure necessary to expand, and developing and executing multiple strategies. These activities 
demand the participation and support of the entire TMT. SMEs usually have small TMTs (4-7 
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members), fostering communication between the CEO and other senior managers. Though the 
founder-CEO plays a central role in making internationalization decisions, other TMT members also 
shape the SMEs’ strategic decisions, especially where a group-centered decision-making process is the 
norm, as it is in Sweden.   
The study also explores the effect of external ownership on SMEs’ internationalization. The 
heterogeneity in ownership structures reflects SMEs’ history and the preferences of their founders 
regarding the degree of control on strategic decisions, the nature of the firm’s products, and the 
funding requirements for growth (Davila, Foster & Gupta, 2003). Variations in external ownership 
structures may influence SMEs’ goals in domestic and foreign markets, determining the scale and 
scope of their international operations. Prior research has not examined how VCs and institutional 
owners influence these variables, an issue this study addresses. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Internationalization Theories 
 Strategy and entrepreneurship scholars argue that firms succeed by building and retaining a 
competitive advantage.  Ireland, Hitt and Sirmon (2003) recently integrated theories from the strategy 
and entrepreneurship disciplines to explain how firms develop and sustain these advantages. They 
noted that firms succeed by identifying and exploiting new opportunities and by deploying their 
resources in ways that allow them to create value.  Some of these opportunities lie in foreign markets, 
requiring strategies that leverage SMEs’ skills and capabilities.  This view is consistent with Dunning’s 
(1988, 2001) eclectic paradigm that proffers that firms internationalize their operations in order to 
capitalize on differences in factor endowments across countries. Dunning also posits that firms’ 
ability to create a sustainable advantage depends on three variables: ownership (e.g., patents), 
location (e.g., transportation cost), and internalization (e.g., management ownership and control) 
advantages.  
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Dunning’s eclectic paradigm highlights the importance of the advantages of ownership in 
shaping internationalization decisions.  It builds on Casson’s (1982) view of entrepreneurship as 
making judgments about opportunities and configuring the resources in pursuit of these 
opportunities.  Agency theory also suggests that these judgments are determined by the decision 
maker’s ownership stake. Thus, judgments about the scale and scope of SME international 
operations will depend on the manager’s perceptions of risks and attractiveness of foreign market 
opportunities.  By applying the eclectic paradigm, our analyses recognize the strategic (Ghoshal, 
1987; Hymer, 1976; Porter, 1986; Vernon, 1966), economic (e.g., cost-benefit) and non-economic 
(risk perceptions) factors that determine SME internationalization (Dunning, 2001; Hill, Hwang & 
Kim, 1990). 
Capitalizing on their firms’ ownership, location, and internalization advantages (Dunning, 
2001), SME owner-managers make important judgments about the size and attractiveness of foreign 
opportunities and their riskiness.  Managers understand that their SMEs are both pushed and pulled to 
internationalize their operations. SMEs internationalize to escape domestic regulations, declining 
demand, and maturing technologies in their home markets (Porter, 1986). SMEs are also pulled to 
internationalize by lucrative opportunities (Ghoshal, 1987).  Even so, managers’ perceptions of the 
risks and returns associated with internationalization influence their strategic decisions. Agency 
theorists hold that assessments of the risks associated with internationalization may vary based on the 
CEO and TMT members’ ownership stakes and external owners may assess these risks differently 
from internal owners.  
Scale and Scope of SME International Operations: Rewards and Risks 
The scale of internationalization indicates the extent to which a firm’s activities depend on 
foreign markets. A large scale of foreign operations allows firms to leverage their domestic skills 
abroad and acquire their market share rapidly (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998). Still, for many SMEs, 
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building a large scale of international operations is challenging because of the diverse skills needed and 
the costs involved (Hill et al., 1990). Success also requires integrating foreign operations, adopting new 
technologies, introducing control systems, and ensuring effective coordination (Porter, 1986).  These 
factors raise the cost of internationalization and increase the odds of an SME’s failure, heightening 
managerial perceptions of risks. 
The scope of internationalization refers to SMEs’ geographic reach around the globe (Lu & 
Beamish, 2001). A broad scope enables SMEs to gain greater returns from their intangible resources, 
achieve market power, and diversified risks (e.g., Tallman & Li, 1996). It also encourages investments 
in building competencies and learning from distant markets and leveraging this knowledge to innovate 
(Hitt et al., 1997).  However, the proliferation of products and markets increases the complexity of 
SME operations, inducing rigidity and lowering market responsiveness.  Local cultures also develop as 
the firm expands, preventing management from cultivating the synergies associated with a broad 
scope, possibly depressing financial performance.  Thus, while Tallman and Li (1996) find a positive 
relationship between international scope and financial performance, others show that increased scope 
might initially improve performance but then decline (Geringer, Beamish & de Costa, 1989), while yet 
others find a linear negative impact (Franko, 1989).  
Still, there are serious risks of not internationalizing as well.  SMEs that fail to internationalize 
may lose their competitiveness, especially when their home markets are small (Franko, 1989), as in the 
case of Sweden. In turn, this may increase income stream uncertainty (fluctuations in performance), 
managers’ personal wealth risk (lower compensation or personal wealth), and competitive risk (not 
having access to resources that enhance competitiveness).  Managers’ perceptions of these risks could 
influence SMEs’ scale and scope of international operations, as discussed next.  
 
 
 
 
7
Internal Ownership and the Scale and Scope of SME Internationalization 
Agency theory highlights the role of ownership in creating the incentives necessary to make 
risky decisions (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Ownership gives CEOs and TMTs an incentive to assume 
the potential risks associated with international expansion (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Eisenhardt 
(1989) observes that two problems arise in typical agency relationships.  The first problem relates to 
differences in risk preferences. The employment and compensation of agents in the form of stock 
options are often based on the performance of their firms, whereas principals can diversify their 
investments.  Tying agents’ personal wealth to firm performance may lead some agents to become risk 
averse because a substantial part of their net worth is tied to the firm. The second problem is the 
incongruence of goals between principals and agents. When this divergence occurs, the potential for 
opportunistic behavior by agents rises. To curb this behavior, principals monitor agents or align their 
goals with those of the firm. In SMEs, many CEOs are also founders and owners, which somewhat 
mitigates principal-agent problems but not the principal-principal problems (Dharwadkar, George & 
Brandes, 2000).  While CEOs or founders may hold a large ownership stake, they may not necessarily 
behave in ways that benefit other owners as well.  For example, while internationalization may create 
value for all shareholders, the risk associated with it may deter CEOs or founders of SMEs because of 
the potential income stream uncertainty that can lower their own wealth. 
Board monitoring of executives and high-powered incentives (i.e., stock ownership) may align 
principal-agent interests and may improve firm performance (Jensen & Murphy, 1990).  However, 
while stock ownership may align shareholder-TMT interests and reduce goal conflict, it might also 
create a risk-averse TMT (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The benefits of incentive alignment notwithstanding, 
some studies show that as CEO and TMT ownership increases, there are likely to be decreases in the 
large firm’s willingness to take risks or invest in long-term projects that exhibit a high degree of 
uncertainty (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Denis et al., 1999; Zajac & Westphal, 1994).  A few studies report 
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mixed results on the effect of ownership on risk aversion (Lane, Cannella & Lubatkin, 1998; Palmer & 
Wiseman, 1999). The bulk of evidence suggests that higher stock ownership by the CEOs and the rest 
of their TMTs may lower their willingness to take risks. We do not know if this effect extends to 
SMEs’ internationalization. Sanders and Carpenter (1998) find a positive relationship between CEO 
compensation and the degree of internationalization in large firms but do not address the ownership 
of the entire TMT, which is important in SMEs.  Documenting the effects of CEO and TMT 
ownership on SMEs’ subsequent internationalization is a necessary extension to this literature. 
CEOs may view internationalization as a means of creating a legacy by building their firms’ 
presence abroad. Internationalization offers an opportunity to capitalize on SMEs’ entrepreneurial 
orientation by being proactive, reaching foreign markets ahead of their competition, and by 
introducing products and process innovations there (Covin & Slevin, 1991; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; 
Miller, 1983). Firms that cultivate such an entrepreneurial orientation as they internationalize their 
operations stand to achieve higher profitability and growth (Zahra & Garvis, 2000). If 
internationalization is profitable, CEOs also gain from building a strong international presence.    
The risks associated with SMEs’ internationalization can undermine CEOs’ equity holdings. 
These risks reflect country-specific conditions such as cultural differences and political instability.  
Risks may arise also from exposing the firm’s proprietary know-how and skills to competitors (Dess, 
Gupta, Hennart & Hill, 1995).  Internationalization also requires substantive capital outlays to build a 
large scale of foreign operations, and the payoff from these investments is uncertain. Agency theory 
suggests that CEOs and other TMT members will withhold investments from broad 
internationalization moves, aiming to protect their wealth and minimize their own risks.  Instead, 
CEOs would favor a more conservative approach to internationalization, aiming to minimize 
competitive and income stream uncertainty and the loss of personal wealth.  CEOs are likely to prefer 
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limited international expansion that does not undermine their SMEs’ domestic position.  Therefore, 
we posit the following hypothesis:     
Hypothesis 1: Higher levels of CEO ownership will be negatively related to the (a) scale and (b) 
scope of SME internationalization. 
 
 Other TMT members may have different goals from those of the CEO (Scott & Bruce, 1987).  
Similar to CEOs, TMT members are likely to be risk averse and prefer a limited scale of 
internationalization.  TMT preferences regarding scope, though, are likely to diverge from the CEO.  
A larger international scope can improve TMT members’ chances of mobility within the SME and 
increase their job security by generating new business opportunities. It also serves to diversify the 
riskiness of the SMEs’ various operations. These managers’ compensation is likely to be tied to their 
business units’ performance and increased organizational size. Given that these gains are more likely to 
materialize if the SME expands across multiple international markets, TMT ownership is more likely to 
encourage the firm to build a broader market scope. Taken together, these observations suggest the 
following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2a: Higher levels of TMT ownership will be negatively related to the scale of SME 
internationalization.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: Higher levels of TMT ownership will be positively related to the scope of SME 
internationalization.  
 
External Ownership and the Scale and Scope of SME Internationalization 
 
SMEs often obtain financial resources from several external sources, including VCs and 
institutional investors. Working individually or in syndication, VCs work with firms with high potential 
but yet unproven technologies or business models.  Some of these firms compete with radically new 
products in new industries and therefore are highly risky. VCs usually have short payback periods and 
anticipate high rates of returns in the firms they fund. Other institutional investors usually fund less 
risky businesses, potentially serving as the second or third source of funding -- with VCs being the 
first.  They also have longer payback periods and lower expected return rates than VCs. Thus, VCs and 
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institutional investors have different risk preferences, time horizons, and profit goals and therefore 
may influence the scale and scope of SMEs’ internationalization differently.  Still, both investor groups 
provide the capital necessary for SMEs’ international expansion. They also monitor management 
decisions (Zahra, Neubaum & Huse, 2000) and help firms make better strategic decisions (George & 
Prabhu, 2000; Thomsen & Pedersen 2000). Currently, we know little about how VCs and institutional 
investors influence SMEs’ internationalization scale and scope.  
VCs and institutional investors can influence a firm’s strategic behavior through persuasion as 
well as private or public activism (Tihanyi et al., 2003; Westphal, 1999). These investors also fund firms 
in particular industries, which allow them to understand the nuances of the decisions managers face.  
CEOs and other TMT members are likely to heed these institutions’ suggestions because of their 
industry expertise and connections to other sources of funding.  Sweden is dominated by pension 
funds that have long-term investment horizons (Henrekson & Jakobsson, 2003). These investors are 
also proactive in expressing their views with management. Institutions also have an interest in 
resolving any disputes in a private manner because public confrontations with senior management are 
expensive and time-consuming. Thus, while activism by institutional investors against large US firms is 
rising (Tihanyi et al., 2003), we expect SME managers to consider and accommodate the preferences 
of these investors.  Swedish institutional investors have a long-term investment horizon and therefore 
may encourage SME managers to support long-term initiatives.  The effect of this long-term influence 
on SMEs’ scale or scope of internationalization has not been empirically documented. 
Despite the benefits of SMEs’ international expansion, some managers may prefer short-term 
profit-maximizing strategies (Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991).  Zahra et al. (2000) show that in order to 
promote investments leading to long-term returns, institutional investors can encourage, and if 
necessary privately or publicly pressure, managers to make the investments necessary for international 
expansion.  Internationalization can improve financial performance, but this takes time to materialize 
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(e.g., Kuemmerle, 2002). These time and cost factors are important determinants of SME strategies, as 
these firms do not have abundant resources to support international expansion over extended periods 
of time.  Risky strategies, such as internationalization, that cause short-term income stream uncertainty 
can be more profitable in the long run than incremental strategies (Bhide, 2000).  Given that 
institutional investors typically invest in a portfolio of firms, they are more willing than SME managers 
to accept higher risks in each individual investment (Davila, Foster & Gupta, 2003; George & Prabhu, 
2003). Thus, they may view aggressive international market entry as critical to an SME’s ability to 
quickly achieve legitimacy in foreign markets. This might lead institutional investors to encourage 
internationalization on a large scale and scope.  Therefore, we posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Higher levels of institutional ownership will be positively related to the (a) scale 
and (b) scope of SME internationalization.  
            
 VCs are another group of external owners who can influence SMEs’ internationalization. VCs 
interact frequently with their managers, communicate their views about future strategies, serve on 
firms’ boards, and closely review SMEs’ investment decisions. Some VCs challenge firm founders and 
even replace them if firms perform poorly or if serious differences of opinion about the firm’s 
strategic options persist.  This active and vigilant involvement of venture capitalists can accentuate 
their influence on SMEs’ important decisions (Davila et al., 2003; George & Prabhu, 2003), such as 
internationalization. 
          VCs specialize in the types of firms they fund, which increases their understanding of the 
strategic importance of internationalization for creating legitimacy, overcoming the limitations of a 
small domestic market, and achieving profitability. These variables will encourage VCs to be 
supportive of building sufficient international business scale to quickly reach profitability in foreign 
operations. VCs understand that SMEs have limited resources and skills, and greater gains could be 
obtained by leveraging these resources in a few markets by building a larger scale of operations. 
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Entering multiple markets could be risky for SMEs because doing so can fragment senior managers’ 
span of attention and make it difficult to realize synergies across different markets. Given the 
attendant risks associated with large-scale internationalization, VCs will encourage managers to select a 
few foreign markets in which they can successfully expand, quickly recoup their investments, and 
make a profit. Therefore, we posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4a: Higher levels of VC ownership will be positively related to the scale of SME 
internationalization. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: Higher levels of VC ownerships will be negatively related to the scope of SME 
internationalization.  
 
Interaction Effects of Internal and External Ownership on Internationalization 
Given that internal and external owners may have divergent goals and time horizons, we need 
to understand how the interaction effects of various ownership combinations influence the scale and 
scope of SME internationalization.  Some research indicates that senior managers change their 
behavior in the presence of large investors (e.g., Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002), alleviating principal-
agent problems. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) found complementarities in the strategic choices 
made by executives and institutional owners make on issues such as taking on and managing debt.  
Yet, empirical documentation is limited on the interaction effect between internal and external 
ownership on the scale and scope of SMEs’ internationalization.  
In a study of 435 of the largest European firms, Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) reported that 
the influence of managerial ownership on firm value increases in the presence of institutional 
investors. They found that the effect of increasing institutional investor ownership from 5% to 15% 
corresponded with an almost 25% increase in the market-to-book value of equity in these firms.  This 
finding highlights the effect of institutional monitoring on increasing senior managers’ willingness to 
invest in long-term value-creating activities. Given their diversified investment portfolios, institutional 
investors participate in multiple industries and can learn from their diverse investment experiences.  
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Learning from the successes of other SMEs allows these investors to provide strategic advice and 
guide SMEs’ decisions (Davila et al., 2003; George & Prabhu, 2003), including the scale and scope of 
internationalization.  Problems of information asymmetry and inadequate knowledge of foreign 
markets that SMEs face (Kuemmerle, 2002; Westhead et al., 2001) can be bridged by the experiential 
knowledge of international markets and industry dynamics of the institutional investors (George & 
Prabhu, 2003).  Investors also have long-term investment horizons and therefore may encourage 
managers to pursue internationalization on a broad scale and scope, overcoming SME managers’ 
conservatism. Therefore, we posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5:  The (a) scale and (b) scope of SME internationalization will be high when 
both CEO and Institutional ownership are high.   
 
Hypothesis 1a posits that CEO ownership will be negatively associated with the scale of 
internationalization. Hypothesis 4a posits that VC ownership will promote a larger scale of 
internationalization. Given that VCs follow industry trends closely and can help managers in making 
these decisions by sharing experiences and identifying additional sources of funds, VCs are positioned 
to overcome senior managers’ apprehension about building a broad international presence, especially 
in small markets such as Sweden. Thus, the interaction of CEO and VC ownership can induce 
managers to build a larger scale of international operations. However, CEO ownership (hypothesis 1b) 
and VC ownership (hypothesis 4b) will both have a negative effect on the scope of 
internationalization. The predicted conservatism by the CEO and the VC is likely to intensify 
resistance to building a broad international scope. This discussion suggests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6a:  The scale of SME internationalization will be high when both CEO and VC 
ownership are high.   
 
Hypothesis 6b:  The scope of SME internationalization will be low when both CEO and VC 
ownership are high. 
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Agency theory holds that high TMT ownership will be negatively associated with the scale of 
internationalization (hypothesis 2a), but institutional ownership will have a positive effect (hypothesis 
3a).  Given the experiences and knowledge that institutional investors possess and share with the TMT 
and because these Swedish institutions have a long-term orientation, as institutional ownership 
increases, the TMT’s reluctance to build international operations on a large scale will dissipate. Thus, 
institutional ownership is expected to overcome the TMT’s conservatism regarding the scale of SME 
internationalization. The same logic applies to the scope of SMEs’ internationalization. The positive 
effect of high institutional ownership on scope (hypothesis 3b) can magnify the predicted positive 
effect of TMT ownership on the scope of SME operations (hypothesis 2b). These observations 
suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7:  The (a) scale and (b) scope of SME internationalization will be high when 
both TMT and institutional ownership are high.  
 
 
VCs are active in shaping SMEs’ strategic decisions because of their ownership stake, 
connections to other institutions, and deep industry knowledge. VCs recognize the necessity of 
building a strong international presence to overcome limited domestic markets and capitalize on 
opportunities in foreign markets.  Hypothesis 4a predicts that as VC ownership increases, the scale 
of SMEs’ internationalization will also increase. Hypothesis 2a posits a negative association between 
TMT ownership and scale of SME internationalization. Consistent with agency theory, VCs’ 
preferences, encouragement, and support will help reduce the TMT reluctance to internationalize on 
a large scale. The opposite effect is expected with the scope of international operations. VCs are 
expected to withhold support of these decisions as being risky (hypothesis 4b) and encourage 
managers to build a larger scale in one or a few foreign markets rather than pursuing a broadly 
defined market scope. These observations suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 8a:  The scale of SME internationalization will be high when both TMT and VC 
ownership are high.   
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Hypothesis 8b:  The scope of SME internationalization will be low when both TMT and VC 
ownership are high. 
 
METHOD 
Design and Sample 
Internationalization is an important concern for SMEs in countries with smaller domestic 
markets for their products (Dunning, 1988).  According to OECD (2002: 193), “More than 99% of all 
enterprises [in Sweden] are classified as SMEs.”  SMEs account for 57% of the value added and 66% 
of net investments in that country. In 2000, three out of five employees in the private sector in Sweden 
worked for SMEs. Given these facts, we collected data by surveying a sample of Swedish firms that 
varied in their internationalization and ownership structures.  Sampling criteria were (a) industrial 
sector divided into four groups based on ISIC codes (manufacturing, professional services, 
wholesale/retail, and other services); (b) employment size class divided into two groups (10-49, 50-249, 
which is the European Union’s cutoffs for small and medium-sized enterprises, respectively); and (c) 
corporate governance (independent firms and members of business groups). The sampling population 
contained 2,455 firms whose names and addresses were obtained from Statistics Sweden (the Bureau 
of Census). We collected data using telephone and mail surveys targeting the CEOs of SMEs.   
In 1997, we collected data for the study's independent and control variables.  We collected data 
for the dependent variables in 2000, reducing potential reverse causality. The three-year lag was chosen 
for several reasons. Notably, SMEs could face many obstacles in internationalizing their operations 
and therefore the effect of these activities might take time to materialize.  Given the scarcity of 
financial resources, managers and external investors alike may become impatient if the payoff from 
internationalization takes longer than three years. Prior studies of SMEs’ internationalization have used 
a three-year time lag (e.g., Zahra, Ireland & Hitt, 2000), as done in this study. 
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To collect data for this study, we contacted the firms by telephone and obtained 2,034 
responses (82.9%).  Shortly thereafter, all firms interviewed were sent a mail survey, generating 1,278 
responses after two reminders, for a response rate of 52.1% of the original sampling population 
(2,455).  In 2000, firms that responded to the 1997 survey were contacted again for a telephone 
interview for the dependent variables.  We excluded data from 28 respondents with firm size greater 
than 500 employees.  T-tests to check for response bias did not reveal any significant difference 
between respondents and nonrespondents for the telephone and mail survey data collection efforts on 
age, size, and ownership characteristics. The final sample with data for 1997 and 2000 was 889 firms 
(36% of original sample; 70% of 1997 survey respondents). 
Measures 
Dependent Variables. Scale of internationalization was measured as the percentage share of a 
firm’s business activities conducted internationally.  It was computed as the arithmetic mean across 
five different items: export share, import share, share of advertising budget directed at international 
markets, share of R&D expenditure abroad, and share of production completed abroad.  Items were 
chosen based on prior studies (Bloodgood, Sapienza & Almeida, 1996).  The measure also sought to 
overcome a weakness of past studies that used the degree of internationalization (i.e., the volume of 
sales from foreign markets) and failed to consider non-sales related activities such as outsourced 
international production or R&D that created value but were not directly captured by sales.  To 
validate the measure for scale of internationalization, we asked respondents to estimate the percentage 
share of their total profits that was derived from foreign markets, a widely used measure (Carpano, 
Chrisman & Roth, 1994).  The correlation between our scale measure and the profits derived from 
foreign markets was high and significant 0.79 (p <.001).   
Scope of internationalization was measured by the number of countries in which the firm had 
direct export relationships. While scope could be defined differently based on industry type and firm 
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size, it is likely that most of the international expansion efforts by SMEs will take the form of exports 
(Lu & Beamish, 2001; Zahra et al., 2000).  Thus, our measure captured the number of countries to 
which SMEs actively exported their products and goods. 
.  CEO ownership was measured by the percentage of firm shares held by 
the CEO.  TMT ownership was measured by the percentage of firm shares held by members of a firm’s 
entire top management team.  Institutional ownership was measured by the percentage of ownership held 
by banks, investment firms, and pension funds. VC ownership was measured by firm shares held by 
venture capitalists.  For the ownership measures, we used data that the CEOs provided because 
detailed information on the ownership structures of Swedish SMEs is not available from public 
secondary data sources.  To validate the ownership measure, we asked the CEOs for their ownership 
stake during the telephone interview and the mail surveys. There was a high and significant correlation 
(r =.86, p <.001) between responses for the two instruments.  
Independent Variables
Control Variables.  The analyses also controlled for the following variables: Firm age, following 
past research was measured as the number of years since incorporation. Firm size was measured as 
the number of full-time employees, controlled for the possibility that it may influence the resources 
available to support SMEs’ internationalization. Firm size might also influence SMEs’ governance 
systems (Westphal, 1999).  
Past performance was measured in two ways. The first was an index consisting of three items, 
comparing a firm to its competitors. The items were net profit, cash flow, and growth of net worth.  
The items had 5-point scales ranging from “much worse than competitors” (coded 1) to “much better 
than competitors” (coded 5). The scale had a Cronbach’s α of 0.76.  The second measure of past 
performance was the number of years in which the firm was profitable out of the past five fiscal years.   
Industry opportunity was measured by a three-item scale that asked for respondents’ perceptions 
of the presence of industry-level opportunities.  Items were “industry development is better relative to 
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the economy”, “unused market potential exists in the industry”, and the “industry is in growth stage.”  
The items had 7-point scales ranging from “completely disagree” (coded 1) to “completely agree” 
(coded 5). The scale had a Cronbach’s α of 0.70. Research indicates that industry opportunity 
promotes internationalization (Bloodgood et al., 1996; Dunning, 1988). We included this variable to 
control for the possibility that domestic market conditions, rather than foreign market opportunities, 
promoted internationalization. This variable also controlled for the possibility that TMTs’ perceptions 
of opportunity rather than risk would foster SMEs’ internationalization.  
New market development captured SMEs’ opportunity-seeking behavior. We asked CEOs this 
question: “over the past three years, approximately what percentage of sales is derived from new 
markets?” We controlled for this variable because entrepreneurial-oriented firms were expected to 
have a significant portion of their sales from new markets (Autio, Sapienza & Almeida, 2000). 
Managerial involvement. Given the fact that not all Swedish SMEs have an independent TMT, we 
asked CEOs if the TMT was actively involved in the firm’s decision-making processes. Managerial 
involvement was a categorical measure where having an active and involved TMT was coded 1 
(otherwise 0).  It is possible that family members included in the TMT are not involved in the firm’s 
strategic decisions.   
Oversight was measured as representation of outside board members as a percentage of the total 
board size, as done in other studies (Zahra et al., 2000).  Though research on SME boards is scarce 
(Huse, 2000), evidence suggests that Scandinavian boards actively monitor and guide the CEOs and 
the rest of the TMT.  Directors who are friends and relatives of the CEO may weaken the board’s 
power relative to the CEO whereas independent outsiders may challenge managers.   
Founder-owner.  Analyses included a dummy variable if the CEO was also the founder, 
controlling for the founder’s effect on internationalization because of his (her) ownership stake. 
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Founder-managed firms could be more entrepreneurial than other firms and may internationalize 
their operations quickly.   
Industry effects were controlled for using dummy codes for the firm’s primary business. Analyses 
included three dummy variables that reflected SMEs’ businesses: manufacturing, retail, service, and 
other industries.  Westhead et al. (2001) found differences in internationalization across industry types. 
Data Analysis 
The data are drawn from two rounds of mail and phone surveys of Swedish firms, collected 
over a three-year period.  This has resulted in some sample attrition (from n = 1, 278 to n = 889) that 
may not be random. Because internationalization is risky, those variables that influence 
internationalization may also cause bankruptcy and failure, and attrition may be systematic in a manner 
similar to self-selection.  To address this bias, we used the Heckman (1976) correction models where 
two equations are developed - one for selection and the other for the dependent variable. These two 
equations are estimated simultaneously.  This method is a two-step estimator model where the probit 
estimation of the selection model is used in the primary regression model to suggest if there is a 
significant selection bias (Berk, 1983).  Such models facilitate unbiased inference to the population 
given that a correct selection model can be developed.  The selection model was developed based on 
logistic regression analysis of variables that differentiated between the total number of observations 
and the uncensored observations. Respondent’s age, ownership share, prior profits, industry, and firm 
age were included in the selection model.  The two-stage estimator method outperforms an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) method only if selection bias is severe (Berk, 1983; Stolzenberg & Relles, 1997: 
503).  In this study, neither was the sample selection bias significant nor did the regression 
coefficients substantively differ between the two-step estimator and the OLS models.  Consequently, 
we used a hierarchical OLS regression model.  To check for multicollinearity issues, variance 
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inflation factors were calculated.  All variance factors were under two, revealing no serious 
collinearity problems.   
To study factors influencing scope of internationalization, an OLS model is inappropriate in 
that the dependent variable takes on a limited range of positive integer values when measured by the 
number of countries.  We used negative binomial regression because it is well suited to handle 
overdispersion in count data (Hausman, Hall & Griliches, 1984).  Negative binomial regression is 
derived from the Poisson process but accommodates variance greater than a normal Poisson process 
(Hausman et al., 1984). Because scope could have a zero value (i.e., no internationalization) that is 
statistically meaningful, we use a zero-inflated negative binomial model with robust standard errors. 
This specification allows for partial observability of zero outcomes and overdispersion of count data.  
Next, we present the results of the data analysis.   
RESULTS 
The correlations for the study’s measures and their descriptive statistics appear in Table 1.   
First, we consider the results for the effect of ownership on scale of SME internationalization.  In the 
OLS model with the control variables, the adjusted R2 of the control model was .21 (Table 2).  To test 
hypotheses 1a-4a, the ownership variables were subsequently entered.  Hypothesis 1a and 2a were 
supported; the CEO and TMT ownership coefficients were negative and significantly associated with 
internationalization scale. Ownership by institutional investors positively influenced SME 
internationalization scale (p <.05), supporting hypothesis 3a. However, the influence of VC ownership 
was significant only at p <.07 (hypothesis 4a) and received weak support.  The direct effects model had 
an adjusted R of .23, with the ownership variables accounting for a change in adjusted R of .02 over 
the control model (F-change = 5.67, p <.01).   
2 2 
------------------------ 
TABLES 1 & 2 
------------------------- 
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To test for the interaction effect among ownership variables, two-way interactions were 
entered.  The CEO x institutional and CEO x VC ownership product estimates were both significant 
(p <.05), supporting hypotheses 5a and 6a.  Of the TMT x institutional and TMT x VC ownership 
product estimates, only the VC interaction was significant (p <.05), supporting hypothesis 8a.  
Hypothesis 7a that posits an interaction between TMT and institutional ownership was not supported.  
The interaction effects model had a change in R of .01 (F-change = 4.36, p <.05 and F-change = 4.18, 
p <.05, respectively).  The full model explained 24% of the variance with a change in R of .03 (p 
<.001) over the base model.   
2 
2 
Some internationalization studies may use the geometric mean for internationalization.  
Calculating the geometric mean reduced the sample size to 485 firms due to the multiplicative function 
in its formula.  Though geometric means are appropriate for indices, they did not fit our data well.  For 
instance, a firm that had 50% R&D activities abroad but no production would still have a zero value 
for scale because of the formula (x * x * x )1/n for geometric mean. When we ran the regression with 
the geometric mean of the scale of internationalization, the negative effect of CEO and TMT 
ownership was significant. Though institutional and VC ownership had positive coefficients, they were 
not significant. There is significant sample attrition when geometric mean is used because we multiply 
the scores where some zero values are included.  Consequently, we use the results of the arithmetic 
mean, which is easier to interpret and provides robust results with a larger sample of 833 observations.  
1 2 n
----------------------------- 
FIGURE 1a and 1b 
------------------------------ 
To illustrate the interaction effects, we plotted ownership against the scale of SME 
internationalization using the OLS regression estimates. We set CEO ownership at low (5%), mean 
(34%), and high (50%) values of ownership, and we entered a range of values for institutional and VC 
ownership. As indicated in figures 1a and 1b, internationalization increased with institutional and VC 
ownership but at a faster rate for those with larger CEO ownership. 
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------------------- 
TABLE 3 
------------------- 
To gauge the influence of ownership on the scope of SME internationalization, we used the 
number of countries as the dependent variable (table 3).  CEO ownership and TMT ownership were 
negatively and significantly related to scope (p <.001 and p <.05) respectively, supporting hypotheses 
1b and 2b. Other main effects (3b-4b) were not supported because institutional and VC ownership 
were not statistically significant. The CEO x institutional ownership was supported at p <.001 
(hypothesis 5b). The CEO x VC interaction was contradictory to expectations; we expected a negative 
effect but found a positive and significant effect (hypothesis 6b). The TMT x institutional ownership 
interaction was significant but in the opposite direction; there appeared to be a negative effect 
(hypothesis 7b).  The TMT x VC interaction effect was not significant and hypothesis 8b was not 
supported.   
DISCUSSION 
SMEs play an increasingly important role in global markets (McDougall & Oviatt, 2000; 
OECD, 2002; Zahra, Ireland & Hitt, 2000). Yet, we know very little about the antecedents of SME 
internationalization, especially the influence of their ownership structures. This study documents the 
effect of internal and external ownership on the scale and scope of SMEs’ internationalization.  This 
section discusses the study’s key findings. 
Internal Ownership and SME Internationalization 
 The results confirm the risk-aversion tendency among SME owners.  Indeed, as the CEO 
and TMT ownership increases, both the scale and scope of internationalization decline, supporting 
hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 2a, but contradicting hypothesis 2b. When the ownership of the CEOs and 
TMTs increases, these individuals become reluctant to pursue substantial internationalization. 
Counter to hypothesis 2b, it appears that the risks associated with greater international scope 
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outweigh the potential gains in terms of greater job opportunities and compensation for the TMT. 
Managers understand that foreign expansion is a costly and risky activity and that failure abroad can 
undermine their wealth, careers and reputations. Consequently, increased ownership by SMEs’ 
managers can induce risk aversion, as proposed by Beatty and Zajac (1994). These results also 
suggest that conflicts arise between the long-term interests of owners and their SMEs. Such 
divergence of interests might induce conservatism that undermines the SMEs’ ability to exploit 
opportunities in foreign markets. 
External Ownership and SME Internationalization 
 One of this study’s contributions is documenting the effect of external owners on the scale 
and scope of internationalization among SMEs.  As theorized, institutional investors and VC 
ownerships are positively associated with the scale of SME internationalization. Thus, institutional 
investors and VCs’ long-term focus is conducive to a larger scale of internationalization. Conversely, 
the results do not support the predicted positive effect of institutional and VC ownership on the scope 
of internationalization. Thus, institutional investors and VCs appreciate the importance of 
internationalizing the SMEs’ different operations but consider scope as unimportant to their 
management of risk.  Although entering multiple markets may create greater expansion opportunities 
for SMEs, it also entails considerable capital outlays, investments in learning, building multiple 
distribution channels, and managing the complex interdependencies that exist across national borders 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998). For VCs and institutional investors, the potential risks associated with 
increased foreign scope may neutralize the perceived opportunities, a plausible explanation for the 
insignificant results observed in this sample. 
Internal and External Ownership Interactions and SME Internationalization 
The results also support agency theory by showing that as internal and external ownership 
increases, so does the alignment of the goals of key players in the SMEs (cf. Eisenhardt, 1989).  This 
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goal alignment appears to mitigate the risk aversion of the CEO. Examining main effects only, greater 
CEO ownership was associated with smaller international scale and scope.  We found, as 
hypothesized, that the simultaneous consideration of institutional and VC ownership changes this 
picture. Scale of SME internationalization increases with institutional and VC ownership but at a faster 
rate for those with a higher level of CEO ownership (figures 1a and 1b).  A comparison of the main 
effect and contingent relationships involving institutional ownership indicates that the influence of 
CEO ownership on the scale and scope of SME internationalization might be misinterpreted if only 
the main effect relationships are examined, or if the ownership of institutions and VCs are excluded. 
These results add to the literature by showing that the involvement of institutional investors in SMEs’ 
strategic decisions might reduce the risk-aversion bias of their CEOs.   
The results regarding the interaction of TMT ownership and VC and institutional ownership 
on the scale of SME internationalization are weaker.  As hypothesized and consistent with the results 
for CEOs, greater VC ownership overcomes the risk aversion of the TMT such that the scale of 
internationalization increases with VC ownership but at a faster rate for those with a higher level of 
TMT ownership. However, the interaction effect of TMT and institutional ownership on scale is 
insignificant. When scope of internationalization is considered, the interaction effect of TMT and 
institutional ownership is negative, which runs counter to our hypothesis while the negative interaction 
between TMT and VC ownership is not supported. It is possible that in most small firms, the CEO 
has the dominant influence on strategic decisions. Consequently, external investors tend to influence 
the CEO more so than the TMT. 
This being said, the support for three out of four hypotheses concerning the ownership 
interaction on scale of SME internationalization suggests that external investors indeed overcome the 
risk aversion of both the CEO and the TMT.  VCs appear to be somewhat more successful at this 
than institutional investors. The non-significant direct effects of institutional and VC ownership on 
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scope suggest that external owners are less concerned about international scope, but still, their 
presence as owners overcomes the risk aversion of the CEO.    
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
The care exercised in the design of this research and data collection efforts using mail and 
telephone surveys from nearly 900 firms help to overcome some of the shortcomings associated with 
cross-sectional SME studies.  Earlier internationalization studies in SMEs have used case studies or 
nonrandom sampling procedures and small sample sizes. These factors have limited the generalizability 
of prior findings.  Our study overcomes some of these concerns.  Still, the study has limitations 
because it was conducted in a single country.  Risk-taking preferences may have cultural roots, and 
restricting the sample to a single country also limits the generalizability of the findings (Hayton, 
George & Zahra, 2002).  The active involvement of institutional investors may also be particularly 
strong in Sweden because of their generally long-term investment horizon. Similarly, incidence of 
public institutional activism is limited in Sweden. Consequently, future research would benefit from 
examining multiple countries, representing multiple cultural groups and institutional environments. 
Even though some have suggested that limited home market size could be one of the factors 
that influence SMEs to go international (Zahra & George, 2002), this does not appear to be the case in 
the current sample of Swedish SMEs.  Although there was a considerable range in the scale of 
internationalization (0% to 79%), the SMEs examined appeared to have a lower mean scale of 
internationalization (mean = 6.9%, s.d. = 12.35) than would be expected because of the small home 
market in Sweden. The limited resources of the SMEs, the perceived riskiness of foreign expansion, 
and management conservatism are plausible explanations for the limited scale of internationalization 
observed in the data.  Future research could help delineate the origins of, and motivations for, 
internationalization by comparing SMEs from multiple industries and countries with greater variance 
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in home market sizes. Such analyses would allow us to draw specific conclusions about the factors that 
pull or push SMEs to internationalize their operations. 
Some SMEs might internationalize their operations because of the attractive opportunities 
that exist in foreign countries (Dunning, 2001).  Entrepreneurship research would benefit from 
examining how SMEs locate and define those opportunities that they ultimately pursue (Ireland et 
al., 2003).  Managerial perceptions of the magnitude and attractiveness of these opportunities 
manifest in the scale and scope of SME internationalization merit further investigation. Researchers 
should also consider other explanations of SMEs’ internationalization decisions such as the need to 
capitalize on monopolistic advantages created in the domestic market, leverage their intangible 
assets, or reap the benefits associated with their global networks (Liesch & Knight, 1999).  
The finding that external owners influence SMEs’ internationalization invites additional 
research. For example, the experience of VCs and other external owners with internationalization 
might influence their contributions to SMEs’ decisions. The length of the relationships these owners 
have with SMEs and prior experiences with their founders might also have an effect. These 
relationships can increase communications between external owners and SME managers, making it 
possible to share assessments of the potential risks and rewards of internationalization.    
The results suggest several avenues for future research on the scale and scope of 
internationalization. We need more research on the firm, business, and functional strategies SMEs use 
to internationalize their operations. Such research will help answer several questions.  For example, are 
there important strategic trade-offs between scale and scope of SMEs’ internationalization? Do they 
influence SMEs’ success in international operations differently in terms of growth and profitability? 
How do the scale and scope influence nonfinancial measures of SME internationalization success such 
as reputation, access to resources, and participation in global networks? Finally, does SMEs’ 
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entrepreneurial orientation moderate the relationship between scale and scope of internationalization 
and firm performance?  
Managerial Implications 
The relationship between institutional owners and managers can be challenging. Yet, the 
results show that increased institutional ownership is conducive to a larger scale of 
internationalization among SMEs. Some managers may view aggressive internationalization as 
undermining SMEs’ survival and successful performance.  If this occurs, these managers might not 
support international efforts. The results show that institutional investors might encourage managers 
to do otherwise, fostering a willingness to internationalize their operations and create new sources of 
revenue that lead to profitability and growth.  Consequently, senior managers should seek to 
cultivate their relationships with the various institutions that hold equity positions in their firms. 
Keeping these institutions informed of SMEs’ strategic plans and soliciting their input and feedback 
are two ways to cultivate this important relationship. Theory and our results suggest that top 
management teams of SMEs tend to be risk averse, with regard to internationalization, especially 
when they have high ownership in the firm. Institutional owners and VCs might mitigate such risk 
aversion and encourage managers to take bolder steps in building an international presence.  
Conclusion 
This study analyzes the effects of SME ownership on the scale and scope of SMEs’ 
internationalization. The results support agency theory arguments that managerial risk aversion 
increases with high CEO and TMT ownership in SMEs, lowering the scale and scope of 
internationalization. Institutional and VC ownership increases the scale of SMEs’ internationalization, 
signaling the important role these investors play in these firms. VCs and institutional owners play 
different governance roles and can align the interests of the CEO and TMT, promoting a larger scale 
of internationalization among SMEs.  The results for scope of internationalization highlight the 
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argument for risk aversion by CEO and TMT.  Even here, the CEO’s behavior changes in the 
presence of institutional and VC ownership, with greater scope of internationalization.  The results 
invite future studies across countries and industries to enrich our understanding of the effect of 
internal and external ownership on the various dimensions and outcomes of SME internationalization. 
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Table 1: Correlations and Descriptive Statistics 
No.  
-.00 -.18 -.30
-.08 -
(.37) 
-.00 .27
-
.01 .03
           Variables Mean
 (S.D.) 
-.52 -
8  Number of profitable years in 
past five years 
3.90 
.05 -.02 -.03 .01
16  Institutional ownership (%)
.13 .03 -.11 .12
1 2 3  4  
(1.49) 
.12 .08
.07 .01 .07
2.38
(14.17) 
.05
-.18 -.07 .12
5  6  7  
3  Manufacturing
 
.01 -.01 .01
11  
.02 .10 -.06
.06 .08 -.03
-
8  9 10
.25 
(.43) 
.23
-.00 .35 -
External board members
composition (%) 
.33 
(.32) 
.01
-
-.05 .03 .04 .02
19  Scope of internationalization 
(number of countries)  
3.89 
(10.88) 
11 12 13 14
.07 -
6  
.17 -.01 .02
.03 -.00
.13 .21 .19
15 16  17  
  
Other industry
 
.03 
-.00 -.00 .00
14  CEO ownership (%) 
 
-.05 .06 -.10
-.06 -.15 .01
18  
1  
(.17) 
.07 .06
.01 -
34.0 
(41.5) 
-.03 -.31
-.06 -
.01 .06
Firm age (years)
 
31.4 
-.10 -.17 -.09 -
9  Industry opportunity
 
-.11 -.11 .26
17  VC ownership (%)
.05 -.10 .10
                   
(27.5) 
-
2  
10.5 
(2.16) 
-.02 .13
.06 .08 .10
 
12.3 
(25.7) 
-.03
 
.03 -.05 -.00 -.01
Firm size (log employees) 
 
3.65 
-.02 -.02 .04
10  New market development
-.09 -
-.01 .05 .03
-
(1.01) 
.10 -
.02 .76 
 
5.96 
(13.5) 
-.08 -.03 -.01
18  Scale of internationalization 
(%) 
6.90 
                
                 
  .07                 
                  
                   
                 
                  
       .08           
         .13          
        -.07 .01         
         .13        
                 
      -.07      
         15      
       .03     
       .00      
      .01      .06  
      -.01  .04      
  
 
.21 
(.41) 
-.10 -.00 -.00
Managerial involvement
 
.82 
. -.02 -.06
-.23 -.13 .06
4  Service
.18
 
.51 
(.50) 
-.21
-.13 .00 -.07
 
.24 
(.42) 
 -.58
.70 
-.35 -.11
  
-.06
-
7  Past performance (survey) 
 
-.12 .16 -.04 -.04
15  TMT ownership (%) 
-.00 .03 -.04
5  Retail
-.11 .07 .11 -.01
13  
.01 .02 .03 -.06
(12.35) 
.15 .25 .36
11.74 
(3.37) 
-.24
-.01 .03 .10
 
.44  
-.15 -.03 .04
.09 -.09
12  Founder-managed (0/1)
-.05 -.13 .33
(5.69) 
.05 .06 -.02
.00 .54
N = 889 observations; observations with values of .05 and above are significant at p <.05, values between .07 and .09 are significant at p <.01, above .10 are significant at 
p <.001; Alphas for scales are reported in bold.
-.20 -
-.02 .03 -.01 -.04
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Table 2: OLS Regression Estimates of Scale of Internationalization 
 
Variables 
-9.14*** 
(1.15) 
-8.51***
.04 
(.03) 
.04 
-.034* 
(.01) 
-.035* 
   
Scale of Internationalization 
Constant 
 
(1.20) 
-8.43***
(.03) 
.04 
(.03) 
(.01) 
-.036** 
(.01) 
.01** 
(.005) 
.01** 
3.47 
(2.74) 
6.02* 
-8.41*** 
(2.84) 
6.16* 
(2.84) 
5.93* 
(1.20) 
-8.38*** 
(1.20) 
External board members (%) -.98 
.057* 
(2.84) 
6.04* 
(2.83) 
Other industry -6.17*** 
(1.16) 
-1.32 
(1.17) 
(.02) 
.047† 
(.02) 
F 
Firm age -.003 
(2.31) 
-6.78*** 
(2.31) 
-1.64 
(1.17) 
-1.48 
(1.16) 
.06* 
(.02) 
.05* 
(.02) 
19.89*** 16.55*** 15.31*** 15.29*** 
(.015) 
-.004 
(.015) 
-.005 
-7.71*** 
(2.34) 
-6.80*** 
(2.30) 
-1.72 
(1.16) 
VC ownership  
14.12*** 
Adjusted-R  
(.015) 
-.004 
(.015) 
-7.70*** 
(2.34) 
Founder-managed  
 
-.98 
.12† 
(.06) 
2 .21 .23 
-.005 
(.015) 
Past performance -.17 
(.19) 
(.95) 
-.02 
(1.03) 
.07 
(.07) 
.05 
(.07) 
.24 .24 .24 
Firm size  2.62*** 
(.42) 
-.16 
(.19) 
-.13 
(.19) 
-.13 
(1.03) 
-.02 
(1.03) 
.03 
(.07) 
Change in R2  
2.39*** 
(.43) 
-.12 
(.19) 
-.11 
-.10 
(1.02) 
CEO * Institutional ownership   
.02** .01* .01* 
2.40*** 
(.42) 
(.19) 
Profitable years in past 5 years 
Managerial involvement 1.11 
(1.09) 
.004* 
(.002) 
 .004* 
.03*** 
 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported (standard error in parentheses); † p <.10, *p <.05,**p <.01,***p <.001 
2.39*** 
(.42) 
2.40*** 
.16 
(.29) 
.13 
(.30) 
.89 
(1.10) 
.84 
(1.08) 
(.002) 
CEO*VC ownership 
(.42) 
Service 
.13 
(.29) 
.10 
.87 
(1.10) 
.83 
 
 
 
-10.8*** 
(.92) 
(.29) 
.11 
(.29) 
(1.09) 
CEO ownership 
.016* 
(.007) 
 
-10.8*** 
(.93) 
-10.8***
Industry opportunity .14 
(.12) 
 
 
-.027** 
(.01) 
.011 
(.007) 
TMT * Institutional ownership 
 
(.93) 
-10.7***
.11 
(.12) 
.09 
-.030** 
(.01) 
-.027** 
   
 
(.93) 
-10.8***
(.12) 
.10 
(.12) 
(.01) 
-.030** 
(.01) 
-.005 
(.004) 
-.005 
 
(.93) 
Retail 
.09 
(.12) 
New market development 
TMT ownership   
(.004) 
TMT*VC ownership 
 
 
(1.19) 
.04 
(.03) 
.04 
(.03) 
-.036** 
(.01) 
Institutional ownership  
(.005) 
Observations (N) 854 
 
 
833 833 833 
 
 
833 
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Table 3: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression Estimates of Scope of 
Internationalization 
 
Variables 
-1.01*** 
(.31) 
-1.21*** 
Managerial involvement -.006 
TMT*VC ownership 
 
Scope of internationalization 
Constant 
(.32) 
Past performance 
(.40) 
-.03 
  
.97 
(.63) 
-1.23  
.05 
(.04) 
.05 
(.40) 
-.04 
(.40) 
.0003 
(.0002) 
Log-Likelihood 
†
(.63) 
-1.20  
(.04) 
.06 
(.04) 
CEO ownership  
-1639.49 -1589.30 
†
(.63) 
Profitability in past 5 years .08 
-.01*** 
(.002) 
-.01*** 
-1587.73 
Chi-squared statistic 
Firm age -.07 
(.08) 
.09 
(.09) 
(.002) 
TMT ownership   
36.97*** 88.13*** 173.07*** 
(.05) 
-.09* 
.09 
(.09) 
-.006* 
(.003) 
Observations 886 
(.04) 
-.09* 
Industry opportunity .03 
(.03) 
-.002* 
(.003) 
865 865 
(.04) 
Firm size  
.03 
(.03) 
.03 
Institutional ownership   -.001 
 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported (standard error in parentheses); †p <.10, *p <.05,**p <.01,***p <.001 
-.46† 
(.27) 
(.03) 
New market development 
(.003) 
-.002 
(.003) 
-.33 
(.26) 
-.33 
-.004 
(.005) 
VC ownership  
(.26) 
Service 
-.005 
(.005) 
-.005 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.02
-.75*** 
 (.22) 
External board members (%) 
 
-1.02*** 
 (.31) 
.26 
(.29) 
CEO * Institutional ownership  
-1.03*** 
 (.22) 
.26 
(.30) 
.20 
 .0003*** 
(.0001) 
Retail -2.10*** 
(.63) 
(.30) 
Founder-managed  
 
CEO * VC ownership  
-2.23*** 
(.53) 
-.42† 
(.26) 
 .001** 
(.0005) 
-2.24*** 
(.52) 
.35 
TMT * Institutional ownership  
Other industry -.77*** 
(.30) 
(.26) 
.35 
(.26) 
 -.0007*** 
(.0001) 
(.005) 
† 
(.008) 
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Figure 1a 
Interaction Effects of CEO and Institutional Ownership on Scale of Internationalization 
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Figure 1b 
Interaction Effects of CEO and VC Ownership on Scale of Internationalization 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0 5 10 15 20 25
VC Ownership %
Sc
al
e 
of
 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
liz
at
io
n 
%
Low CEO Ownership
Mean CEO Ownership
High CEO Ownership
 
 
 
37
 
 
Gerard George is an assistant professor of entrepreneurship at University of Wisconsin-Madison.  His 
research addresses the patterns and processes of capability development and deployment in 
organizations.  His areas of interest include international entrepreneurship, university science, and the 
performance of start-ups and privately held firms.  He serves as director of the applied ventures 
program at the Weinert Center for Entrepreneurship at the UW School of Business.   
 
Johan Wiklund is an associate professor of entrepreneurship at the Center for Entrepreneurship and 
Business Creation at Stockholm School of Economics.  His research interests include the study of 
growth and internationalization patterns in entrepreneurial firms.   
 
Shaker A. Zahra is Paul T. Babson Distinguished Professor of Entrepreneurship at Babson College at 
Wellesley, MA. His research focuses on international, corporate and technological entrepreneurship. His 
research, teaching and professional service activities have received several awards. He is the director of 
the Babson-Kauffman Entrepreneurship Research Conference (BKERC) and incoming program chair 
for the Academy of Management’s Entrepreneurship Division. 
 
 
38
